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ABSTRACT: Foreign labour was an essential resource for the Nazi war economy: by 
September 1944, around six million civilian labourers from across Europe were 
working in the Reich.  Any initial readiness on the part of the peoples of Nazi-
occupied Europe to volunteer for work in the Reich had quickly dissipated as the 
harsh and often vicious treatment of foreign workers became known.  The abuse and 
exploitation of foreign forced labourers by the Nazi regime is well documented.  Less 
well understood is why women formed such a substantial proportion of the labour 
recruited or forcibly deported from occupied eastern Europe: in September 1944, a 
third of Polish forced labourers and just over over half of Soviet civilian forced 
labourers were women.  This article explores the factors influencing the demand for 
and the supply of female labour from the Nazi-occupied territories of the Soviet 
Union, particularly  after the appointment of Fritz Sauckel as Plenipotentiary for 
Labour in March 1942.  It explores the attitudes of labour officials towards these 
women workers and shows how Nazi gender politics and the Nazi hierarchy of race 




On 16 March 1943, an official in the labour administration in Nazi-occupied eastern 
Ukraine sent out orders to the local labour recruitment teams. In order to meet the 
targets of the latest crash programme to deport Soviet civilians as labourers to the 
Reich, each local district under military administration was with immediate effect to 
‘recruit’ and dispatch to the Reich 500 workers per week, ‘primarily women’ (‘in 
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erster Linie Frauen’).1 Why, one might wonder, would the recruitment teams have 
been told to recruit ‘primarily women’? 
 The coercive and violent recruitment of labour in occupied Ukraine was one 
strand in the vast history of forced labour under Nazi rule, involving not just mass 
deportations of prisoners of war and civilians to work in Germany and other countries 
under Nazi rule, but also forms of forced labour within the occupied countries 
themselves.2 To talk of forced labour entails definition, as Mark Spoerer and others 
have discussed: there were gradations of forced labour, and in wartime Nazi 
Germany, with its highly regulated labour regime applying also to German men and 
women, it would be inaccurate to talk of German workers being free of coercion.3 But 
for the purposes of the following discussion of foreign forced labour working in the 
Reich, it is helpful to refer to the criteria outlined by Spoerer that a forced labourer is 
unable to terminate their employment of their own accord and has little or no control 
over their conditions of living and working.4  
 On the basis of that definition, forced labour in Nazi Germany was 
predominantly foreign: labour was a fruit of conquest. Spoerer estimates the 
accumulated total of foreign workers (civilians and POWs) deployed in the Reich 
over the course of the Second World War at around 12 million, of whom 80–90 per 
cent could be regarded – according to his definition – as forced labourers.5 Statistics 
for September 1944 showed 5.97 million foreign civilians working in the Greater 
German Reich, who at that point constituted 26 per cent of the Reich’s (civilian) 
labour force.6 Forced labour comprised not only foreign civilian deportees plus 
                                                 
1 Wirtschaftsinspektion Mitte, Chefgruppe Arbeit (an Verteiler), betr. Anwerbung von 
Ostarbeitern für das Reich, 16. März 1943.  Bundesarchiv [= BA] Berlin, R3901, 20273. 
2 Pioneering studies include: Edward Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, 
1967); Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des „Ausländer-Einsatzes“ in der 
Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Berlin and Bonn, 1985); Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Europa 
und der „Reichseinsatz“: Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in 
Deutschland 1938–1945 (Essen, 1991).  
3 Mark Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, 
Kriegsgefangene und Häftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939-1945 
(Stuttgart and Munich, 2001), 10–19; Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, ‘Forced 
Laborers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers, and Survivors’, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 33 (2002), 169–204, here 173–6; Marc Buggeln, 'Unfreie Arbeit im 
Nationalsozialismus: Begrifflichkeiten und Vergleichsaspekte zu den Arbeitsbedingungen im 
Deutschen Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten’, in Marc Buggeln and Michael Wildt (eds), 
Arbeit im Nationalsozialismus (Munich, 2014), 231–52. 
4 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit, 15. 
5 Ibid., 221. 
6 Ibid., 9, 222. 
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prisoners of war (the latter totalling 2.19 million at the start of 1945), but also 
concentration camp prisoners (including foreign Jews brought to the Reich) and 
German Jews deployed as forced labourers: including them brings the cumulative 
total of forced labourers in the Reich during the war to an estimated 13.5 million. A 
further calculation would bring in additional estimates of forced labour undertaken 
within the occupied countries under Nazi rule.7 In the Reich, the atrocious treatment 
of workers from eastern Europe was notorious: among civilian forced labourers from 
the occupied Soviet territories, Spoerer suggests that around 170,000 died.8 
 If historical research on forced labour was relatively sparse in the 1960s and 
1970s, since Ulrich Herbert’s landmark study in 1985 a huge literature has developed, 
some studies exploring the role of regime agencies and individual companies 
employing forced labourers, others tracing how forced labourers were part of local 
economies.9 Crucially, this work has increasingly drawn on the testimonies of former 
forced labourers, many of whom – as Johannes-Dieter Steinert has shown – were 
dragged to Germany as children and adolescents.10 Most recently, studies have 
extended their focus to the labour administration in the occupied territories, asking 
both about deportations to the Reich and the ways in which people were made to 
‘work for Germany’ in their own countries.11  
 The majority of foreign labourers working in the Reich were male. Women, 
however, constituted a rising proportion of the total foreign labour force in the course 
of the war, and these growing contingents were recruited above all from eastern 
Europe. While foreign women came from across occupied Europe, it was already 
                                                 
7 Buggeln, ‚Unfreie Arbeit’, 243–51. 
8 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit, 228. 
9 Recent collections include Karsten Linne and Florian Dierl (eds), Arbeitskräfte als 
Kriegsbeute: Der Fall Ost- und Südosteuropa 1939–1945 (Berlin, 2011); Andreas Heusler, 
Helmuth Trischler and Marc Spoerer (eds), Rüstung, Kriegswirtschaft und Zwangsarbeit im 
„Dritten Reich“ (Munich, 2010); Dieter Pohl and Tanja Sebta (eds), Zwangsarbeit in Hitlers 
Europa: Besatzung, Arbeit, Folgen (Berlin, 2013) and (with a wider comparative dimension) 
Kerstin von Lingen and Klaus Gestwa (eds), Zwangsarbeit als Kriegsressource in Europa 
und Asien (Paderborn, 2014). 
10 Alexander von Plato, Almut Leh and Christoph Thonfeld (eds), Hitler’s Slaves: Life Stories 
of Forced Labourers in Nazi-Occupied Europe (New York and Oxford, 2010); Johannes-
Dieter Steinert, Deportation und Zwangsarbeit. Polnische und sowjetische Kinder im 
nationalsozialistischen Deutschland und im besetzten Osteuropa 1939–1945 (Essen, 2013). 
 11 Karsten Linne, Florian Dierl, Zoran Janjetović, Pflicht, Zwang und Gewalt: 
Arbeitsverwaltungen und Arbeitskräftepolitik im deutsch besetzten Polen und Serbien 1939–
1944 (Essen, 2013); Tanja Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler: Arbeiten und Leben im 
Donbass 1939 bis 1953 (Essen, 2010). 
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clear in 1941, before the arrival of civilian workers from the occupied Soviet 
territories, that the bulk of women workers coming into Germany were from Poland 
and that the proportion of women among the total of Polish workers in the Reich was 
higher than among the contingents from other countries.12 The arrival of civilian 
labour recruits/deportees from the occupied Soviet territories brought a further 
upswing in the proportion of foreign workers who were female: already by early 
summer 1942 it was evident that that women were constituting around half of the 
transports. In September 1944, of the 5.97 million civilian foreign workers deployed 
in the Reich, one third were women.13 Just over half of all civilian forced labourers 
from the occupied Soviet territories and a third of the forced labourers from occupied 
Poland were female, and Polish and Soviet women conversely formed the biggest 
contingents among foreign female workers. Of the 1,990,367 foreign women working 
in the Reich in September 1944, 586,091 were from Poland and 1,112,137 were 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’, the term used by the National Socialist regime for the women 
brought as labourers to the Reich from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.14 
Such figures contrast with the lower absolute numbers and the lower proportion of 
women workers among the labour recruited from occupied western Europe: for 
instance in September 1944, 29,379 Belgian women and 42,654 French women were 
working in the Reich, constituting 14.6 per cent of Belgian workers and 6.6 per cent 
of French workers respectively.15   
 Gender has rarely been in the forefront of the concerns of historians writing 
about forced labour.16 Many studies have masked or downplayed the issue. However, 
references are to be found in the literature to the gender composition of the labour 
deportees, and one obvious starting point for thinking about patterns in the 
recruitment and exploitation of female forced foreign labourers is the correlation 
pointed out by Ulrich Herbert thirty years ago between the proportion of foreign 
labourers of a particular nationality that were women and the position of that 
                                                 
12 Der Arbeitseinsatz im Deutschen Reich Nr. 21 (1941), 5.November 1941, 19.  
13 Der Arbeitseinsatz im Großdeutschen Reich Nr. 11/12 (1944), 30. Dezember 1944, 11. 
14 Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 272.  
15 Ibid.; Der Arbeitseinsatz im Großdeutschen Reich Nr. 11/12 (1944), 30. Dezember 1944, 
11. 
16 Important exceptions include Gabriella Hauch, ‚Zwangsarbeiterinnen und ihre Kinder: Zum 
Geschlecht der Zwangsarbeit’, in: Oliver Rathkolb (ed.), NS-Zwangsarbeit: Der Standort Linz 
der „Reichswerke Hermann Göring AG Berlin“, 1938–1945, vol. 1 (Linz, 2001), 355–448; 
Tamara Frankenberger, Wir waren wie Vieh: Lebensgeschichtliche Erinnerungen ehemaliger 
sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiterinnen (Münster, 1997). 
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nationality in the Nazi racial hierarchy. The lower the status in that hierarchy, the 
higher the proportion of women among those recruited.17 The significance of this 
correlation, though, demands to be explored further: how self-evident was it that the 
Nazi labour administration would recruit more women of a ‘lower’ racial category 
(Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians) for work in the Reich than women from the 
occupied countries of western Europe? 
 One set of insights into the recruitment of female forced labourers from the 
Soviet Union derives from studies of labour mobilization policies within the Reich. 
These policies were shaped by assumptions about priorities in the war economy, 
about how far prisoners-of-war and foreign civilians should be brought in to fill gaps, 
and – at a time when the regime was eliminating the Jews from wartime German 
society – how incoming ‘alien’ workers were to be strictly segregated from Germans. 
Along with the overall dynamic of evolving policy on foreign labour there were 
changing perceptions of what foreign women, and particularly eastern European 
women, were good for. Initially, these focused largely if not exclusively on the 
deployment of Polish women into agricultural and domestic work, but from mid-1942 
onwards the incoming ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ became seen increasingly in terms of their 
potential to fill jobs in industry, particularly in armaments-related production. Here, 
historians have traced how the drive to deploy foreigners, and specifically foreign 
women, was linked to the difficulty of getting more German women to work in 
industry above and beyond those already bound, increasingly long-term, into 
industrial work.18 As these studies have shown, the mass influx of foreign women into 
semi-skilled and unskilled production-line jobs and their deployment in heavier and 
more hazardous work relieved some of the pressure on the labour administration to 
squeeze more under wartime conditions out of German women already working in 
industry, and to propel additional German women into industrial jobs.19 However, 
there is still scope for further probing of the question whether ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ were 
seen by employers and the labour administration as a preferred resource (compared to 
male ‘Ostarbeiter’ and/or German women) or simply as a last resort.20 It is also not 
                                                 
17 Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 271. 
18 Homze, Foreign Labor, 10; Rüdiger Hachtmann, ‘Industriearbeiterinnen in der deutschen 
Kriegswirtschaft 1936 bis 1944/45’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 19 (1993), 332–66. 
19 Hachtmann, ‘Industriearbeiterinnen’, 348, 350. 
20 See Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 207 on contemporary perceptions of the work performance of 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ compared to German women. 
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clear from studies hitherto whether labour officials thought there were any limits on 
what even women workers deemed to be ‘racially inferior’ could be expected to do.  
 Regional studies of German occupation policy shed further light on the reason 
for the large numbers of women recruited for work in the Reich from the occupied 
Soviet territories by teasing out the ‘push’ factors in different regions of Ukraine and 
Belorussia. The conditions within which deportations took place were shaped by 
Soviet military conscription and evacuation measures, unemployment, food shortages, 
economic dislocation and population displacement following German occupation, and 
subsequently the spread of partisan resistance.21 German responses to these conditions 
and the occupiers’ assumptions about the existence and scope of ‘surplus’ or 
‘unwanted’ population in the occupied territories helped determine the scale and 
composition of the transports to Germany from early 1942 onwards. Women, 
particularly young women, were a prominent element in the pool of potential labour 
and subjected along with their fellow-countrymen to inducements, propaganda and 
direct coercion from the recruiting commissions combing the occupied Soviet 
territories from the end of 1941. Yet it is still worth asking how far the proportion of 
women who ended up in labour transports to the Reich was a matter of accident or 
design.  
 The ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors at work in the recruitment of ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ 
highlight what may appear as a straightforward logic of substitution that governed 
Nazi wartime efforts to keep the economy in the Reich and in the occupied territories 
supplied with labour. At the same time, the insights of gender historians alert us to the 
singular paradoxes at work in the racist Nazi ‘rationality’ that constructed Soviet 
women workers as endlessly flexible and interchangeable ‘hands’. These paradoxes 
may help illuminate further the correlation between the imagined hierarchy of race 
and the recruitment of female labour. In the 1980s, Gisela Bock showed how theories 
based on both ‘racial hygiene’ and racial anthropology attenuated the polarity of the 
                                                 
21 Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in 
Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 ((Hamburg, 1999), esp. 449–93; Babette Quinkert, Propaganda 
und Terror in Weißrussland 1941–1944: Die deutsche ‚geistige’ Kriegführung gegen 
Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen (Paderborn, 2009), 257–73; Penter, Kohle für Stalin und 
Hitler, 179–291; Herwig Baum, ‚“Für die Stadt Kiew wird eine’Fangaktion’ vorbereitet...’“: 
Akteure und Praxis der Zwangsarbeiterrekrutierungen in der Ukraine während des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges’, in: Linne and Dierl (eds), Arbeitskräfte als Kriegsbeute, 270–302; Dieter Pohl, 
Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in 
der Sowjetunion 1941–1944 (Munich, 2008), 305–19. 
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sexes in their construction of ‘inferior’ human types or racial groupings.22 She argued 
that this assumption – that ‘inferior races’ lacked the polarity of the sexes 
characteristic of the ‘superior’ peoples – was at work in the regime’s treatment of 
foreign women workers. Along with Polish women, Soviet women were constructed 
as the ‘other’ of German womanhood within the wartime workforce, with Jewish 
women and Sinti and Roma women being regarded as lower still in the Nazi hierarchy 
of race. However, such constructions were bizarrely inconsistent: stereotypes of 
Soviet women could conjure up both the ‘asexual phantasm’ of an endlessly 
exploitable ‘work hand’ and fixate with racist obsessiveness on their supposed 
hyperfecundity.23   
 The attention paid by historians of gender to the question of women’s bodies 
and their reproductive as well as productive capacity has also informed research on 
Nazi policies on race, sexuality and population: this in turn opens further perspectives 
on the deportation of Soviet (and Polish) women to work in the Reich. In one view, 
forced labour and mass labour deportations also served to attack the ‘biopower’ of 
eastern European peoples.24 This was a vision expressed at its racist and misogynist 
extreme by the SS racial expert Erhard Wetzel in his notorious commentary on 
‘General Plan East’ (Generalplan Ost) with its fantasies of mass anti-natalist 
campaigns in a future occupied Russia.25 From another angle, the importation of 
‘Slavic’ women alongside men has been interpreted as the effort to create a sexual 
‘buffer’: their presence was, it has been suggested, part of a deliberate strategy to curb 
                                                 
22 Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und 
Frauenpolitik (Opladen, 1986), 135–7. On this idea of a racist ‚attenuation’ of sexual polarity, 
see also Gabriella Hauch, ‚Die Institutionalisierung der NS-Bevölkerungs- und Sexualpolitik 
gegen Ostarbeiterinnen und Polinnen: „Modell Oberdonau“? in: Gabriella Hauch (ed.), 
Frauen im Reichsgau Oberdonau: Geschlechtsspezifische Bruchlinien im Nationalsozialismus 
(Linz, 2006), 215–26, here 216–17, and Frankenberger, Wir waren wie Vieh, 44–5. 
23 Hauch uses the term ‘asexuelle Phantasmen’: ‘Institutionalisierung’, 217. For examples of 
German stereotypes of Slavic women’s alleged hyperfecundity, see Bock, 
Zwangssterilisation, 440–1.  
24 On labour and labour deportations in the context of anti-natalist measures against eastern 
European populations: Bock, Zwangssterilisation, 445; Homze, Foreign Labor, 29–30; 
Frankenberger, Wir waren wie Vieh, 20–1. 
25 Erhard Wetzel, Stellungnahme und Gedanken zum Generalplan Ost des Reichsführers SS, 
27. April 1942, in: Czesław Madajczyk (ed.), Vom Generalplan Ost zum 
Generalsiedlungsplan (Munich, 1994), 50–81, here 73–5; see also Bock, Zwangssterilisation, 
440–2. 
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sexual contact between German women and the foreign men who were constructed as 
a threat to the German national body.26  
 Soviet women may thus have appeared to recruiters as an accessible and 
interchangeable mass of ‘pure labour’ destined for whatever menial tasks they were 
set and subject, like their menfolk, to uninhibited force; they may also have been 
sought as female labour for specific sorts of ‘women’s work’. Women may have 
figured as an ‘unproductive’ surplus in the occupied territories, or as a ‘biological 
threat’, to be displaced as part of population and spatial restructuring and on that basis 
destined for potential dispatch to the Reich, they may even have been regarded as a 
‘sexual buffer’ protecting German women from the attentions of eastern European 
men. This article takes these hypotheses as a starting-point for asking how far those in 
charge of labour deployment and other labour officials explicitly reflected on or 
expressed their perceptions and motives for recruiting Soviet women for labour in the 
Reich. It is beyond the scope of this article to sum up the thinking on these questions 
on the part of all the agencies involved in the German civilian and military apparatus 
of occupation and the authorities concerned with the labour question within the Reich. 
Instead, the following discussion considers examples from official decrees, 
publications and internal correspondence in order to offer some pointers to the 
thinking of labour officials about the recruitment and deployment of women from the 
occupied Soviet territories in the Reich as ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’.  
 
Questions of supply and demand 
 
In January 1941, Friedrich Syrup, a senior civil servant in in the Reich Ministry of 
Labour, articulated his vision of a multinational labour pool marshalled and mobilized 
across the expanding economic space under Nazi domination in such a way that 
‘reserves’ would be tapped and ‘surpluses’ shifted to areas of demand: the imagery 
was of flows and streams resulting in supranational cooperation to the benefit of all.27 
Syrup’s expansive rhetoric masked both the measures increasingly used to stop 
western European workers in the Reich terminating their contracts in order to go 
                                                 
26 For the suggestion that this was a factor in the recruitment of eastern European women for 
work in the Reich, see Gisela Schwarze, Kinder, die nicht zählten: Ostarbeiterinnen und ihre 
Kinder im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Essen, 1997), 98; Frankenberger, Wir waren wie Vieh, 24.  
27 Friedrich Syrup, ‚Probleme des Arbeitseinsatzes im europäischen Großraum’, Der 
Vierjahresplan Jg. 5, Nr. 1–3, Januar 1941, 20–1. 
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home,28 and the by now established practices developed by the German labour offices 
in Poland of coercion and violence in the recruitment of labour for the Reich. It also 
passed over the ways in which racial/ethnic restructuring in Poland was implicated in 
the creation of ‘surpluses’ of potential labour, and the involvement of the labour 
administration in these displacements and selections.29 The recruitment policy in 
Poland had by the autumn of 1941 brought more than a million Poles to the Reich, 
just over a quarter of them women, and subjected them to draconian and stigmatizing 
special decrees.30 The precedent for forcing civilian women alongside men onto 
labour transports to the Reich was thus in place when German troops invaded the 
Soviet Union. However, the mass deportation to the Reich of female alongside male 
civilian labour from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was not an immediate 
imperative at the outset of occupation and emerged piecemeal in the winter of 1941/2. 
The rounding-up of women was part of the wider picture of the quest for any and all 
‘hands’ and reflected perceptions of where a ‘surplus’ of labour existed, but it also 
came to include the specific targeting of women as women. 
 Expecting a quick victory, the regime leadership assumed in the summer of 
1941 – despite predictions to the contrary from labour experts in the field as well as in 
the Reich – that transporting forced labourers from the newly-occupied Soviet 
territories to the Reich would be superfluous.31  The focus instead was on seizing 
agricultural produce, in the process depriving the local population to the point of 
famine and flight from the cities, and forcing the population to work in situ for the 
Germans.32 To secure and control this local labour, a network of labour offices was 
quickly set up both in the areas under civilian administration (Reich Commissariat 
Ostland and Reich Commissariat Ukraine), and in the areas nearer the front line that 
                                                 
28 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit, 97. 
29 On the involvement of the labour administration in the expulsion and displacement of Poles 
in the annexed territories and in the General Government, see Karsten Linne, 
‚Volkstumspolitik und Arbeiterrekrutierung im Reichsgau Wartheland’, in: Linne and Dierl 
(eds), Arbeitskräfte als Kriegsbeute, 107–38, idem., ‚Die deutsche Arbeitsverwaltung 
zwischen „Volkstumspolitik“ und Arbeiterrekrutierung – das Beispiel Warthegau’, and idem, 
‚„Sklavenjagden“ im Arbeiterreservoir – das Beispiel Generalgouvernement’, in: Linne, Dierl 
and Janjetović, Pflicht, Zwang und Gewalt. 
30 Linne, ‚Die deutsche Arbeitsverwaltung’ , and ‚„Sklavenjagden“ im Arbeiterreservoir’; Der 
Arbeitseinsatz im Deutschen Reich, Nr. 21 (1941), 5. November 1941, 19; Diemut Majer, 
‘Fremdvölkische im Dritten Reich’ (Boppard, 1981), 304–14. 
31 Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 456–8. One exception to this was the dispatch of more than 
fifteen thousand agricultural workers from Lithuania and Belorussia to East Prussia in July 
and August 1941. 
32 Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 186–7. 
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remained under military administration.33 In a succession of decrees from August 
1941 onwards, a labour obligation was imposed on both sexes: this initially covered 
Jews aged 14–60 and non-Jews aged 18–45: the age range for non-Jews was 
subsequently extended.34 With the mass murder of Soviet Jews already under way, the 
Nazi occupiers saw forced labour for Jews as a short-term interlude before these 
workers, too, would be murdered and replaced as workers by non-Jews.35 In the first 
phase of occupation, Jews and non-Jews, the latter including women with children 
and the elderly, were drafted into ‘work columns’ deployed on road-building, 
infrastructure repair, or snow clearance.36  
 As the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union stalled from the autumn of 1941 
onwards, more and more German men had to be called up to replace the men lost on 
the Eastern Front, leaving ever more gaps in the war economy.37 Soviet prisoners of 
war were the first to be considered as a labour supply, but by the beginning of 
November 1941 so many POWs were already dead or dying of starvation and 
murderous neglect that the decision was taken, under Goering’s lead as the head of 
the Four Year Plan apparatus, to recruit civilians.38 In December 1941, to speed up 
recruitment of Soviet civilian labour the Reich Labour Ministry dispatched 
recruitment teams (Werbekommissionen) to the occupied Soviet territories, including 
the former Baltic states, staffed by seconded officials from regional labour offices in 
the Reich. A new target of more than 600,000 recruits from the occupied Soviet 
territories was set on 24 February 1942: this would subsequently be raised to between 
1.4 and 1.5 million after the appointment of Fritz Sauckel as Plenipotentiary for 
Labour (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz or GBA) on 21 March 
1942.39 As targets grew ever more dizzying, patterns of interaction between recruiters 
and local populations that had been seen in Poland played out once again. Initial 
efforts at recruitment elicited some compliance among those who believed recruiters’ 
promises and who sought an escape from poverty, hunger and destruction in their 
immediate surroundings.40 However, reports quickly filtered back about the horrors of 
                                                 
33 Baum, ‚“Fangaktion“, 273–5; Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 197, 207. 
34 Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 452; Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 306. 
35 Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 454. 
36 Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 307. 
37 Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 137–43. 
38 Ibid., 140–3, 148–9. 
39 Ibid., 158; Quinkert, Propaganda und Terror, 259; Pohl, Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, 312. 
40 Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 198; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 467. 
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the journey to the Reich, about being treated like prisoners, stigmatized with the OST 
badge (like the Poles with their P badge), fed starvation rations with mouldy and 
rotten food, put up in filthy and primitive barracks, abused in the workplace and paid 
virtually nothing. The readiness to use force had been inherent in the process of 
recruitment from the start: as this news spread in the occupied territories, recruiters 
soon came to depend on threats and coercion.41  
 For all the parallels with the deportations of Polish labour, the significant 
proportion or even preponderance of women among the labour deportees from the 
occupied Soviet territories was a new departure. Observations by labour 
administrators based in the occupied eastern territories and those in Berlin, together 
with comments from the recruitment officials in the field, shed some light on the 
reasons for this. The recruiting commissions were already finding in early 1942 in 
their areas of recruitment in the occupied eastern territories a shortage of men: women 
were for several reasons a significant or predominant element among the civilian 
population of working age from teenagers upwards. First, the Soviet authorities had in 
face of the German invasion evacuated plant and skilled manpower eastwards, 
depleting the adult male workforce.42 Second, men who had been called up to the Red 
Army had been killed or captured: among these were the estimated 2.53 million 
Soviet prisoners who died in captivity, many within the occupied territories.43 Third, 
the Wehrmacht, Organisation Todt and the railways administration required labour on 
the spot in the occupied territories and were quick to snap up any skilled male 
workers available.44 From late 1942, the absence of men intensified as the partisan 
movement gained momentum; German anti-partisan activity with the goal of seizing 
labour in turn escalated resistance further.45  
                                                 
41 Quinkert, Propaganda und Terror, 258–9. 
42 Rolf-Dieter Müller, ed., Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen 
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 From the outset, recruitment teams struggled to meet demands set by the 
Reich labour authorities. To take the example of the head of one such team operating 
in southern Ukraine in 1941/2, one can observe both his rapid resort to intimidation 
and violence to fill the ‘transports’, and the unfolding of his bureaucratic rationale that 
made a virtue out of necessity. This entailed ‘selling’ the idea of female recruits to the 
labour administration back home. Having arrived in Uman in southern Ukraine 
shortly before Christmas 1941 with the mission (as he understood it) to recruit labour 
for his home region of Bavaria, Graf Kajetan von Spreti reported in February 1942 
that he had dispatched his first trainload of Ukrainian civilian workers for Bavaria 
only after having had the town governor of Uman hang two Jewish women and one 
Jewish man for allegedly spreading rumours about the fate of workers sent to 
Germany and causing panic among the deportees’ parents.46 Meanwhile Spreti was 
grappling with the absence of male civilians to recruit, having established on his 
arrival that along with 6000 Soviet POWs present in his area of operations there were 
4408 civilian workers registered with the local labour office (Arbeitsamt) of whom 
the overwhelming majority (4100) were female. Among the women registered he 
identified female agricultural workers, including milkmaids, that farms in Bavaria 
urgently required. Having sought confirmation from the Reich Labour Ministry in 
Berlin47 and received the go-ahead from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine for the 
recuitment of female labour, particularly for agriculture,48 he then sought in the 
following months to square his ‘transports’ not just with a series of upward revisions 
of the total target but also with a stream of contradictory orders from Bavaria: 
 
First of all it was only men to be sent, because it had not yet been clarified 
how women were to be deployed (…) then I received a telephone message 
from the Bavarian regional labour office on 20 February 1942 that suddenly 
2000 female workers were needed as soon as possible. I received a further 
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message on 23 February ordering the dispatch of 5000 workers for the spring 
planting, predominantly female. Then I received the order that transports from 
18 April onwards were to comprise only women. This was then corrected on 
26 April to the effect that it was now also possible to deploy male agricultural 
workers. It will be evident that this sort of management makes the task here 
much more difficult.49 
 
Spreti’s correspondence with the Bavarian regional labour office also made it clear 
how young the recruits were: of the 900 that had by March 1942 been set to work in 
Bavaria, most were aged between 16 and 20, had not previously been employed and 
had been taken out of schools or institutions.50 
 In the subsequent months it became a routine assumption among labour 
officials that the transports of civilian deportees from the occupied eastern territories 
would include substantial numbers of mainly young women: indeed, propaganda 
designed to combat increasingly well-informed antipathy towards the prospect of 
working in Germany came to address young women specifically.51  Meanwhile, 
Sauckel had in his first programmatic announcement on 20 April 1942 not only 
signalled his overall plans for ‘a gigantic new deployment’ of workers of both sexes 
from the age of 15, but also an eye-catching programme specifically to recruit Soviet 
women to work in Germany. Described as a special mission from Hitler, Sauckel 
announced his goal of recruiting ‘400,000 – 500,000 strong and healthy girls’ from 
the occupied eastern territories to work as servants in urban and rural households in 
Germany.52 This announcement was coupled with a reassurance to those German 
women who had not yet been drawn into the workforce that, on Hitler’s orders, the 
supreme importance of the health of German women and mothers took precedence 
over any plans for conscripting women for work in war production. 53 
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By late 1942, with the trawls for deportees increasingly scouring an already emptied 
reservoir, female labour was still presented as a relatively promising target for 
combing out and delivering to the Reich.54 That said, it was soon evident, for instance, 
that Sauckel’s push to recruit hundreds of thousands of domestic servants was 
unrealistic: it was reported from Belorussia in January 1943 that against a target of 
30,000 domestic servants, by November 1942 only a few hundred had been secured.55 
By the spring of 1943, regulations regarding recruitment from the occupied Soviet 
territories were changed again, allowing whole families to be brought to Germany as 
long as half the persons in the family were aged 10 or over, and on the other hand 
putting in place measures to seize entire cohorts of a particular age.56 
 Meanwhile, the notion that the forced deportation of young women was a 
particular outrage was proving to be a rich seam for Soviet counter-propaganda.57 
This did not go unnoticed, and in March 1943 a complaint from the German army 
leadership reached the labour authorities claiming that the deportation and 
exploitation of young Russian women in the Reich and the dismal spectacle of 
returnees from Germany (including pregnant women and mothers with newborns 
transported in unheated wagons without food) was a propaganda disaster for the 
German authorities in the occupied East.58 This elicited the following observation 
from Walter Letsch, a civil servant from the Reich Labour Ministry now seconded to 
Sauckel’s Plenipotentiary of Labour apparatus: ‘The mass recruitment and 
deployment of young Russian women and girls in the Reich’, he noted, ‘is necessary 
for reasons that are decisive for the outcome of the war. It is indispensable.’ 
Moreover, he commented, ‘eastern workers’ were no longer for the time being being 
brought back home from the Reich, and pregnant women were not going to be 
brought back in future at all. To that extent, the ‘difficulties’ alluded to would not 
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recur and therefore, he concluded, ‘no action is necessary’(‘zu veranlassen ist daher 
nichts’).59 
 
An endlessly flexible resource? 
 
Farm work was one key destination for female forced labourers from Poland in the 
early stages of the war and initially for ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ as well. With a long-term 
shortage of labour in agriculture caused by rural-urban migration now made more 
acute by the wartime conscription of farm labourers and farmers themselves, the trope 
of the ‘overburdened German farmer’s wife’ was coupled with larger alarmist 
messages about the whole future of German ‘blood’ and ‘soil’.60 While such 
arguments were used to push German youngsters into harvest help and forms of 
‘service’ on the land, after the defeat of Poland the channelling of Polish workers – 
who as migrant seasonal workers were long established as a source of agricultural 
labour on eastern German estates – on to farms in the Greater German Reich appeared 
to offer a less piecemeal answer.61 Polish women sent to work in the Reich between 
1939 and 1941 had been predominantly placed on farms, and when Soviet women 
started arriving in early 1942, they too were initially directed primarily into 
agriculture. A study of agricultural employment in wartime Lower Austria (‘Gau 
Oberdonau’) shows the numbers of ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ employed after 1942 as 
agricultural workers in ‘Gau Oberdonau’ as being on a par with male ‘Eastern 
workers’ and by May 1944 coming to equal the number of Polish women employed in 
agriculture there.62 Farm work, it seems, corresponded to sexist and racist 
assumptions on the part of the labour administration about the place of female ‘Slavs’ 
at the bottom of the wartime labour hierarchy, but also their supposed fitness and 
willingness to take on long hours and hard, dirty work.63 At the same time, the labour 
administration also saw female workers from eastern Europe as a particularly 
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manoeuvrable mass: labour offices were more prone to switching them than their 
male compatriots from jobs in industry into short-time harvest work such as sugarbeet 
and potato harvesting.64  
 After 1942, the initial concentration of foreign labour in agriculture gave way 
to a broader deployment across economic sectors: Soviet workers, both male and 
female, were increasingly channelled into industrial jobs. The capacity of 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ for work in industry was commented on by German observers and 
labour experts from a variety of perspectives. Some saw the deployment of women in 
Soviet industry as a factor that could now benefit the German war economy. The 
German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront or DAF) issued a report in May 1943 
praising women workers from the occupied Soviet territories for their levels of 
education and intellectual adaptability. Comparing them with German women 
workers, the DAF declared that ‘the Ostarbeiterin shows a certain dexterity and 
capacity to adapt to factory work here’, and noted that it was ‘not uncommon’ for 
women in the Soviet Union to learn a ‘masculine’ manual trade that equipped them 
with a basic technical training.65  Sauckel himself had cruder notions, which could be 
read as a colonialist and racist view of robust but primitive natives, of why 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ should be set to work in German industry. These stemmed not least 
from Sauckel’s obsession with the physical condition of the women he observed on 
his May 1942 visit to occupied Ukraine: in the words of his report, ‘Wherever one 
goes one is struck by the rude health (strotzende Gesundheit) of the women.’ 66 This 
fixed idea underlay Sauckel’s blustering insistence on the dichotomy between the 
‘valuable’ but allegedly more fragile German woman worker and the endurance of the 
female ‘eastern worker’.  The ‘health’ of ‘Russian women’ that rendered them a 
potential substitute for male labour again featured in his speech at a meeting of labour 
administrators in Weimar in January 1943: ‘As long as I can get them from you I will 
put Russian women to work at machines. (...) Everything that lives over there in 
Soviet Russia is healthy. I will put these Russian women to work in their hundreds 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 129. 
65 Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront (ed.), Arbeitseinsatz der 
Ostarbeiter in Deutschland. Vorläufiger Bericht zur Untersuchung des 
Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts über Arbeitseignung und Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Ostarbeiter, Berlin, Mai 1943.  
66 Bericht des Gauleiters Sauckel über seine Reise in die Sowjet-Ukraine in seiner Eigenschaft 
als Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz [Mai 1942]. BA Berlin, R43 II, 652. 
 17 
and thousands. They will work for us. They can hold out for 10 hours and can do 
every sort of man’s work.’67  
 The deployment of ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ in industry in the Reich over the last 
three years of the war ranged from work as semi-skilled operatives to heavy unskilled 
labour. In the chain of substitutions and reorganizations taking place as skilled men 
were called up, Soviet women were both replacing men and substituting for women: 
however, they tended to be compared to German women. A study undertaken by 
Krupp comparing the work performance of Germans and foreigners of different 
nationality showed ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ performing strikingly well against the 
comparator group of German women workers.68 Many employers spotted this and in 
the light of such experiences specifically demanded more ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’, 
particularly where they could be slotted into re-organized and standardized production 
processes requiring semi-skilled rather than skilled workers.69 German and Austrian 
women were a much less elastic reserve of labour: foreign women were both cheaper 
and more flexibly deployable.70 The protective legislation in force for German and 
Austrian women workers concerning working hours, which had been initially 
loosened at the very start of the war, but then restored, did not apply to foreign 
women workers.71 Where foreign women workers were put onto semi-skilled and 
unskilled production-line jobs, some limited scope opened up for employers to devise 
part-time shifts for German women. These were seen as an incentive, particularly 
after the decree of 27 January 1943 compelling hitherto non-employed German 
women aged 17–45 to register for war work, for German women to take up and 
remain in industrial work and as a way of combating absenteeism.72 Alternatively, 
production was re-organized so as to give ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ heavier and more 
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hazardous work, with German women shifted to lighter tasks.73 In this way, German 
women workers were given an improved position in the hierarchy of the wartime 
workforce, with new categories defined by race and nationality extending the 
hierarchy downwards below them.74  
 The labour administration was engaged in many respects in a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in the way it sought to turn foreign female labour into ‘pure’ labour, 
boundlessly deployable. The new Maternity Protection Law of May 1942 and the 
‘housework day’ introduced by the Labour Ministry in October 1943 were attempts to 
manage, rationalise and reconcile the multiple roles of German working women as 
mothers, in the household and in production.75 These measures were simultaneously 
designed to differentiate the female workforce further along lines of ‘race’ and 
nationality. Foreign women were excluded from such measures: they were denied 
family life and deprived of basic elements of privacy. Their bodies were exposed to 
scrutiny and inspection from the moment of deportation to repeated inspections in 
their barracks accommodation.76 They were exposed to sexual exploitation and could 
be punished for sex with Germans, even where evidence suggested this was coerced.77 
With regard to control over reproduction, eastern European women were 
systematically disadvantaged compared to other foreigners. Reversing the original 
policy of re-deporting pregnant workers from the Reich back to their homelands, a 
change that took place at the end of 1942, Sauckel’s labour apparatus left a loophole 
allowing ‘western’ women workers to continue to travel back to their country of 
origin, while this was ruled out for Polish women and ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’.78 In a 
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mercilessly antinatalist reversal of the enhanced ‘maternity protection’ granted to 
German women workers, abortions for ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ and for Poles were 
decriminalized: this led in practice to forced abortions.79 If the women concerned did 
go ahead and give birth, they were often compelled to leave their children in crèches 
and ‘homes’ in which many died from neglect and malnutrition; meanwhile, the 
mothers were to return to work as soon as possible, with the concession – at least on 
paper – that they might be put on ‘other work’ such as clearing-up tasks before 
returning to their earlier jobs.80 
 There are indications that employers and labour officials alike adapted readily 
on the whole to a regime of exploiting eastern European women workers, in the 
process rolling back gender-based rules and safety precautions. Sent as a supply of 
labour to the Fürstlich-Plessische Bergwerke in Upper Silesia at the beginning of 
January 1943, Ukrainian women were hired out to building subcontractors involved in 
constructing new mine buildings,81 while others worked alongside German women in 
tasks above ground. Here, the Upper Silesian mine authorities sent in March 1943 
instructions to the management of individual coal mines in the region with regard to 
the campaign to involve more women in working in the Upper Silesian coalfields. The 
circular specified that coal mines must apply strict rules to the deployment of women 
and assign them only to jobs they were genuinely capable of. Such jobs were 
absolutely to exclude work at the pit bank (Hängebank). However, the instructions 
continued, ‘insofar as foreign women are available, they can be assigned to the more 
difficult jobs’.82 At the same time, underlining the way in which female labour was 
regarded as conveniently flexible, mine managers used ‘eastern women’ (‘Ostfrauen’) 
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as a handy source of domestic help in their private households, deploying them out of 
hours cleaning windows or cleaning up after the decorator.83 
 Not all firms reacted the same way to being supplied with female workers. 
Some companies complained at being sent women when they had requested foreign 
men, and requested them to be swapped. Rebutting such complaints, the labour 
administration noted that there was nothing to be done about the high proportion of 
women and youngsters under 18 among the ‘Ostarbeiter’ transports: there was no 
prospect of swapping contingents of ‘eastern workers’ on the basis of age or physical 
capacity and it was up to the firms to reorganize production to ensure an ‘optimal 
deployment’ of the workers they had been sent.84 When an aircraft factory 
complained that the ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ it had been sent were not strong enough for the 
work, a scribbled exchange on the correspondence between the labour officials 
included the comment that ‘The labour office in Saxony has no men to send, and 
anyway, the female Ostarbeiter are stronger than the men’.85 
 Some taboos about deploying foreign women did remain in force. Whereas 
Ukrainian women constituted 28.5 per cent of the workforce in the coal mines of the 
Donbass in German-occupied Ukraine in July 1943, working underground as well as 
in jobs on the surface, all women were banned from working underground in coal 
mines in the Reich itself.86 This ban, declared a representative of the DAF, was based 
on the conviction that women could not be contemplated undertaking the ‘singularly 
masculine’ job of miners at the coalface even during wartime: this ban on working 
below ground applied to foreign women workers as well.87 In this case at least, the 
gender of the foreign women workers was regarded as decisive.  Issues about the 
permeability or impermeability of boundaries demarcating men’s and women’s work 
                                                 
83 Kassenabzugsbeleg, Fürstlich Bergwerks-AG Sekretariat, 22. März 1943. BA Berlin, 
R9363, 6. 
84 GBA, MR Dr. Letsch, MR Dr. Petzold betr. Arbeitseinsatz von Ostarbeitern in 
Deutschland, an das Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, 8. Okt. 1942. 
BA Berlin, R3901, 20270. 
85 GBA an den Präsidenten des Landesarbeitsamtes Sachsen, Dresden, 10. Sept. 1942. BA 
Berlin, R3901, 20269. 
86 Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 216–17; Hans-Christoph Seidel, ‚Ein buntes 
Völkergemisch hat eine Wanderung durch unsere Gruben gemacht’: Ausländereinsatz und 
Zwangsarbeit im Ruhrbergbau 1940–1945’, in: Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Christoph Seidel 
(eds), Zwangsarbeit im Bergwerk: Der Arbeitseinsatz im Kohlenbergbau des Deutschen 
Reiches und der besetzten Gebieten im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, vol. 1, 75–159, here 87. 
87 Ernst Stein, ‚Schaffende Frauen in Bergwerksbetrieben’, Der Vierjahresplan 5 (1941), no. 
16, November 1941, 859–61. 
 21 
where foreign women workers were concerned also arose in shipbuilding. In the 
Bremen shipbuilding yards, as Renate Meyer-Braun has shown, German women, 
mostly female relatives of the male employees, had taken on jobs in production from 
the start of the war. However, it was the deployment of ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ as welders 
that opened up the question of the taboo about women working on board the ships 
under construction. For the local labour office and the factory inspections officer, with 
the prospect of eastern European women welders working alongside men in the 
conditions on board ship that were particularly hard to oversee, the gender of the 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ suddenly appeared relevant: the women came into view as women 
not as workers requiring protection but as a potential moral threat, an ‘immoral’ 
presence in a hard-to-supervise work situation.88   
 In a further instance, this time in munitions production, questions of health and 
safety were brought into play in a discussion involving the deployment of 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’. In an argument in 1942 between the regional labour office in 
Pomerania and the Air Ministry it was argued that ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ should replace 
German women producing grenades in a munitions plant: the German women, it was 
proposed, should be ‘released’ due to the dangerous gases to which they were 
exposed. The labour officials involved in the dispute took the view that 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ with their supposedly more robust constitutions should indeed be 
employed rather than German women. However, rather strikingly, perhaps in a 
residue of earlier assumptions, the deputy director of the Pomeranian regional labour 
office made the point that the plant should invest in better ventilation, ‘since after all 
even Ostarbeiterinnen should as far as possible be guaranteed some measure of health 
protection’.89  
  
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ as domestic helps 
 
On the face of it, Sauckel’s 1942 campaign to recruit young Ukrainian women to 
work as servants in German households flew in the face of administrative and 
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economic logic. Leading civil servants in the Reich Labour Ministry projected an 
image of the labour administration across the territories under Nazi rule as dedicated 
to optimizing production for the war effort.90 Its purpose was to make the supply of 
labour from across Europe flow correctly, guided by objective analyses of shortfalls 
and the possibilities of substitution; it was characterized by a technocratic logic of 
initiative, improvization, flexibility and problem-solving.91 This logic of transparency 
and ‘flow’ was in tension with the fixed idea on the part of Hitler and Sauckel that the 
resources of the German household and the German housewife must be preserved and 
enhanced even in the midst of a wartime labour crisis. Sauckel’s announcement in 
April 1942 that up to half a million domestic helps were to be brought from the 
occupied Soviet territories to relieve the burden on German housewives was a 
spectacular manifestation of this thinking. In the view of Edward Homze, ‘[a]t at time 
when Germany was fighting most of the world and German industry was desperately 
short of labor, Hitler was, in the best tradition of Viennese courtliness, worrying about 
the additional burden the war had placed on the German Hausfrau’.92 For Ulrich 
Herbert, there was more than a whiff of colonialism about a policy that conjured up a 
notion of German privilege and comfort resting on the labour of conquered peoples.93 
Yet the pledge to provide domestic help en masse was also bound up with the 
maintenance of conventional gender roles and ideas of the traditional ‘home’: the 
gender polarity supposedly inherent to German identity and distinguishing it from 
‘lower’ peoples was part of the ‘normality’ that was to be upheld and disseminated in 
the face of a mass influx of foreigners into the Reich. This at least is one reading of 
Sauckel’s April 1942 programme, where the announcement about 
‘hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen’ as part of his ‘gigantic’ new deployment of 
labour from the conquered Soviet territories was coupled, as we have seen – along 
with fulsome praise for the efforts of German women already in the labour force – 
with the pledge to stave off the conscription of women who were not yet employed.94 
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 Allowing labour resources to vanish into the realm of private consumption 
thus had a political if not economic logic. Recruiting foreign servants no doubt also 
made sense to German middle-class housewives, given that ever fewer German girls 
and women wanted to accept the low wages and long hours of domestic service when 
other jobs beckoned.95 A perception of the ‘Ostarbeiterin’ as a ‘natural’ servant also 
took root within the armed forces stationed in the occupied eastern territories.96 Army 
units secured local women to work in their canteens, and officers started to recruit 
women for their own households as well, bringing them back to Germany when they 
went on home leave. In September 1942, once the Wehrmacht’s conquest of a further 
swathe of Soviet territories gave Sauckel access to new supplies of labour, a meeting 
was held to confirm that the recruitment of domestic servants would now begin in 
earnest. It was noted at that meeting that the ‘self-service’ actions by members of the 
Wehrmacht were to be confirmed and legalized retrospectively.97 By November 1942, 
however, the practice was seemingly getting out of hand and a ban was imposed on 
such ‘private’ recruitment.98  
 Nevertheless, there was a countervailing logic as well. Given the rules and 
regulations regarding the surveillance and physical segregation of Polish and Soviet 
workers, their stigmatization through the P and OST badges and the insistence on 
maintaining social and sexual boundaries between them and Germans, placing Soviet 
women as domestic servants into German homes was problematic, all the more so 
given Nazi views of the German home reproducing Germanness through the intimacy 
of domestic life.99 One answer, signalled in the decree that implemented the 
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recruitment campaign, was to play down the problem of racial difference by selecting 
candidates who would ‘resemble Germans as closely as possible’.100  This peculiar 
strand of thinking seemingly went back to Sauckel’s idiosyncratic impressions of 
Ukraine picked up during his May 1942 visit, when he spotted among the population 
‘numerous racially good, healthy and even Nordic looking people, particularly among 
the women’.101 In theory, domestic helps were to be selected and ‘racially screened’ 
before dispatch to Germany, but oral testimonies suggest that private employers 
simply picked out their candidates from a line-up of recently recruited young Soviet 
women at the local labour office, leaving the rest to be assigned to other jobs.102 
 The other approach used by the labour administration to square the circle of 
bringing an alien ‘Ostarbeiterin’ into the heart of the German home was the attempt to 
lay down regulations for how private homes employing such domestic helps were to 
be organised.103 Regulations specified that an ‘Ostarbeiterin’ working as a domestic 
servant could not share her quarters with a German servant.104 She was to carry out 
domestic tasks without being in close contact with the family or becoming involved in 
the care and education of children.105 Her employers, meanwhile, were advised to 
educate their servant ‘in German order and housekeeping’ and to refrain from 
discussing ‘war-related difficulties and worries’ in front of her.106 These elaborate 
instructions represented a bureaucratic operation on the part of the labour 
administration to preserve a sense of proper racial order and hierarchy. At the same 
time, they embodied a striking paradox in the way they sought to counter the very 
privacy and individuality that was the essence of domestic ideology and seemed 
                                                 
100 8. Sept 1942, Sonderaktion des GBA zur Hereinholung von Ostarbeiterinnen zugunsten 
kinderreicher städtischer und ländlicher Haushaltungen, Reichsarbeitsblatt Teil I, 1942, Nr 
27, 411. 
101 Bericht des Gauleiters Sauckel. BA Berlin, R43 II, 652.  
102 Susanne Kraatz (ed.), Verschleppt und vergessen: Schicksale jugendlicher 
“OstarbeiterInnen’ von der Krim im Zweiten Weltkrieg und danach (Heidelberg, 1995), 89; 
see also Annekatrein Mendel, Zwangsarbeit im Kinderzimmer. ‚Ostarbeiterinnen’ in 
deutschen Familien von 1939 bis 1945. Gespräche mit Polinnen und Deutschen (Frankfurt am 
Main, 1994). 
103 Merkblatt für Hausfrauen über die Beschäftigung hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen in 
städtischen und ländlichen Haushaltungen, Reichsarbeitsblatt Teil I, 1942, Nr. 27, 413–15, 
104 Ibid., 414. 
105 8. Sept. 1942, Sonderaktion des GBA zur Hereinholung von Ostarbeiterinnen zugunsten 
kinderreicher städtischer und ländlicher Haushaltungen, Reichsarbeitsblatt Teil I, 1942, Nr. 
27, 412. 
106 Merkblatt für Hausfrauen über die Beschäftigung hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen in 
städtischen und ländlichen Haushaltungen, 413. 
 25 
symbolically to drag the home into the realm of the regulated economy and the 
official gaze.  
 The first transport of domestic helps from Ukraine departed from Stalino 
(Donetzk) in September 1942.107 Households seeking an ‘Ostarbeiterin’ as a domestic 
servant had to apply to their local labour office and have their political reliability 
checked by a Party functionary.108 Those whose applications were approved were 
summoned to select ‘their’ domestic servant at the local labour office.109 From then 
on, employers seem to have regarded themselves as in a position to treat their servants 
as they pleased. At any rate, a security service (SD) report in January 1943 suggested 
both the satisfaction of housewives at having a servant whom they could order around 
at will, and their lack of regard for regulations about separation and social distance. 
Beyond recommending that Nazi women’s organizations should be dispatched to 
inspect and admonish the wayward housewives, however, the report suggested little 





‘In labour deployment there is no such thing as impossible’, declared Fritz Sauckel in 
a typically grand verbal gesture made at the end of October 1942 in a circular to 
officials of the labour administration in the Reich and in the occupied territories.111  It 
corresponded to the self-image of the senior officials in the labour administration that 
their efforts, constituting a many-faceted ‘kaleidoscope’112 of initiatives and devices 
to achieve their targets, should be seen in terms of technocratic solutions to gigantic 
tasks and challenges. For all the euphemistic visions of balancing forces within a ‘new 
European order’, the movement of labour across the continent under Nazi control was 
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anything but a smooth flow of surpluses shifted to areas of shortage, but involved 
coercion on a grand scale by officials in the field and the snatching up of ‘pools’ 
created by ethno-racial displacement, enforced food shortages and flight/evacuation as 
front lines shifted. If Soviet propaganda chose to focus particularly on the fate of 
young women dragged to Germany and subjected to abuse, the bureaucratic response 
was to hold the line. If the forcible recruitment of young women from the occupied 
Soviet territories was not primarily motivated by an anti-natalist vision of decimating 
the Slavic peoples through attacking their reproductive potential, the actions taken by 
the labour administration to secure at any price the labour of women who became 
pregnant, including forced abortions, could make it effectively part of such a strategy.  
  Coming back to the quotation and the question posed at the start, the 
instruction to recruit ‘primarily women’ can be seen partly as a simple reflection of 
the availability of women and absence of men in occupied Ukraine and Belorussia. It 
does not, despite some accounts, seem to be the case that transports from the occupied 
eastern territories were carefully put together to ensure a ‘parity of the sexes’. Any 
sense of labour contingents being straightforwardly ‘ordered’ with a pre-set 
composition regarding skill, age or gender is belied by the shortages on the ground 
and the hostility to recruitment that soon set in. It seems, rather – taking the example 
of Graf Spreti in the Ukraine – that recruiters in the field had scope for pushing their 
own recruitment solutions upon their ‘home’ areas.  
 Up to a point – for instance in the case of the campaign to secure domestic 
servants – women in the occupied Soviet territories were recruited specifically as 
women for ‘female’ tasks. However, they were also recruited as a generic supply to 
fill gaps in the labour force regardless of gender. If employers requested skilled male 
labour and there was none available, the labour administrators sought to manage 
expectations but also promoted Soviet women as a substitute. Tamara Frankenberger 
has suggested that the ‘Ostarbeiterin’ was in many respects the embodiment of an 
ideal worker: cheap, flexible, compliant, not subject to restrictive protective 
regulations and without family ties. Within the logic of ‘flow’ and repeated 
substitutions and relocations in the latter years of the war, they could appear as a 
supply of ‘pure’ labour deployable anywhere. The awkward fact of their pregnancies, 
which emerged as an issue already in the summer of 1942, merely prompted swift and 
often brutal intervention. In some cases, their previous experience and training within 
the Soviet economy gave them an additional advantage; more generally, their gender 
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and the supposedly natural affinity with menial and dirty work made it appear that 
they could be summoned to undertake – for instance – cleaning or clearing-up work 
after hours. From the point of view of employers, who had welcomed the Nazi 
destruction of trade unions and restored what was characterized as managers’ right to 
manage, the advent of such a labour supply might seem like a welcome return to a 
much earlier era. There remains, however, more to be done to assess the exact limits 
of what work the labour administration and employers deemed acceptable for 
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ to do and where remaining inhibitions or taboos, at least relating to 
work within the Reich, still prevailed. 
 Finally, the deployment of ‘Ostarbeiterinnen’ needs to be seen in relation to 
Nazi gender ideology, wartime policies towards German women, and the maintenance 
of racial hierarchies and gender polarities within and outside the workplace. The 
extension downwards of the labour hierarchy to create new groups at the bottom 
(Poles, Soviet workers, Jews) in effect enhanced the position of German women 
workers who would otherwise have been on the lowest rung in terms of pay and 
status. The availability of workers to take on the hardest jobs potentially modified the 
working hours and conditions of German women. This can be seen as a rationalizing 
strategy to induce women to juggle housework and paid work on the basis of much-
vaunted protective policies and the de-privileging of others. Meanwhile, the pledge 
(largely unfulfilled in practice) that hard-pressed housewives and mothers of large 
families could acquire an ‘Ostarbeiterin’ as a servant was rooted in a notion of gender 
polarity and traditional family structures as a distinguishing marker and privilege of 
Germans as the ruling class of Europe. It also suggested the maintenance of a sense of 
‘normality’ in the domestic sphere at a time when for many the comforts and routines 
of home were undermined by wartime conditions. The uninhibited grab for ‘alien’ 
women as servants again partly suggests a throwback to an earlier age when 
households could treat servants entirely as they pleased – but also a sense that these 
women were a novel resource absorbing the strains on Germans in wartime, part of 
the perks of empire brought into the German home.  
 
 
  
